

## **1.0 Summary**

### Findings and observations:

Robust bot software that offers lots of features to the author or other controller. We saw that there was a detailed system inventory function; ability to (at a minimum) inventory local networks; update the C2 server; update the software; provide troubleshooting info to the author(s) in the event of errors; anti-analysis techniques; remote shell access; remote execution; various methods of hiding the malware and its traffic/activities; presumed encoding features to provide information back to C2 in the form of account names, etc.; and features that allow the bot controller to recon remote systems and also attack those systems. We also found many things in this sample and the previous sample (the launcher) to obfuscate the bot code such as encryption (AES) and other encoding (MD5, base64, xor).

### Recommendations:

Same recommendations as noted in the analysis of the launcher. One might also consider blocking port 69 for TFTP unless this is actively in use, as this was shown to be one source of downloading updates for this malware.

### Conclusion:

Really cool and fascinating bot to work on. Lots of features and functionality for the authors. We saw that not only does it provide some useful features such as the ability to scan and exploit other machines, remote shell access, but also housekeeping functions such as error tracking and reporting and an update feature as well. This was a great sample to work on.

## **1.1 Identification**

File Name: payload.exe [analyst assigned]

File Type: 32-bit Windows executable

Malware name(s): BEAR.payload

Current detection: 42/53

Malware type: Bot client

Size: 56,892 bytes

Packer: None

Encryption/encoding: base64, MD5

Origin: Dionaea honeypot running in New York City (also obtained about a week later in a German honeypot)

Compile time: 24DEC2009 13:25:55Z

### Hashes:

MD5 : d4851b410d158cf650d3f772e270f305

SHA1 : 4ee5121b05820e8f04b6560f422180660df29b2d

SHA256 : 267674ddf67827afa282763e57313fc636f170fbffaf104e69ee4db49d1567d5

ssdeep : 1536 : daWAQE3GZ8CAu9ax2Ma07tJoQuQTKZc9q3RxFuEUK : JAQE2UHa02QQTv4XF9Uk

Test environment details: Win 7 Home Premium SP1 running in VirtualBox 5.0.18\_Ubuntu r106667 on Ubuntu 16.04. Hardware is an Acer Aspire 5742 (Intel i3).

## **1.2 Dependencies**

OS: Windows 4.0 and higher

Imports (DLLs): msvcrt.dll, kernel32.dll, ws2\_32.dll, user32.dll, advapi32.dll, shell32.dll (in header).

From code: netapi32.dll, mpr.dll, psapi.dll

Exports: None

Other: Requires access to port 4466 via IRC for C2, and ports 80/21/69 for the various ways that it can connect to receive updates (HTTP/FTP/TFTP respectively)

## **2.0 Characteristics**

### **2.1 Behavior**

This sample gathers information about the host and then establishes communication with a C2 channel over IRC. The malware then idles in this C2 channel, periodically testing connectivity, while it waits for instructions. There also appears to be functionality for transferring files/data, so it's possible that this sample also exfiltrates data as well. This sample engages in anti-analysis behavior and other design features that complicate analysis. This sample does not appear to engage in privilege escalation, both in terms of observed code and behavior. There are many features that the C2 can engage such as remote shell, remote execution, IP address scanning and exploitation, and updates to the C2 server address.

### **2.2 Infection**

The malware executes upon user action (either running from the command prompt or from Explorer or the equivalent). The malware spawns a child process shortly after. This child process is subject to replacement and this overall process iterates many times. The PHP found at 37.59.118.41 downloads and starts the malware as a service.

### **2.3 Persistence**

When running with administrator privileges, the malware executes a series of process replacements of various Windows executables before finally setting the last one to autorun. Unlike the previous analysis of BEAR.launcher, the payload only spawned a single copy of each replaced process (unlike the two processes replaced in BEAR.launcher).

### **2.4 Movement**

Not observed during cursory examination when a machine with a running instance of the sample was connected to a LAN. There was usual intra-LAN traffic observed, but nothing appeared malicious. Network recon functionality was observed, however.

### **2.5 Data Exfiltration**

None explicitly observed, but the C2 available through the IRC channel appears to allow for this to take place. It is possible that there was no hostile operator around to trigger any of these features in the running instance.

### **2.6 C<sup>2</sup>**

C2 appears to be managed from an IRC server at her.d0kbilo.com:4466 in the channel #Balengor. IRC commands are passed in plaintext however communication between the bot and the C2 entity appear encrypted. There is a user associated with this channel on that server, e.TK, which appears to be the user that the malware interfaces with after check-in. This user was also observed when entering the channel from an IRC client.

### **2.7 Signatures**

This executable drops a randomly named batch file into the same directory where the executable and each interim replaced process was run. This batch file contains commands to delete the executable and then the batch file afterwards. This file will remain (and its execution will fail) if the user is not running in admin mode.

The malware appears as a process with the same name as the file, with the final process named spoolsv.exe. The child process is created with the same name, but then random windows processes are created and replaced with the malware payload. When running in admin mode, any one of a number of processes can be replaced such as winamp.exe, algs.exe, logon.exe, winlogon.exe, spoolsv.exe, spoolsv.exe, lssas.exe, iexplore.exe, and possibly others that were not yet observed. It's assumed that this is both to help hide the running malware process and to interfere with debugging and analysis.

Referring to the above process, the malware will add a registry value to ensure that the final replaced process in the above series is run at startup. This value is always located at:

```
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows DLL Loader:  
"C:\Windows\system32\spoolsv.exe"
```


The following key can be observed on the host as well, in order to enable access through the firewall for the sample:

```
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List\C:\Windows\system32\spoolsv.exe:  
"C:\Windows\system32\spoolsv.exe:*:Enabled:Windows DLL Loader"
```

A mutex was created: dc3d5c2012d372867 88b94a5d50d7a3cf0

IRC traffic can be observed to her.d0kbilo.com on port 4466. This domain always resolves to 37.59.118.41 at this time. The malware contains code to generate an HTTP header (HTTP 1.0) so this could also be observed as indicating malware traffic if this is not a normal header for the host system.

### 3.0 Raw Notes



```
psapi.dll
system
SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardPro
file\AuthorizedApplications\List
/s:*:Enabled:/s
explorer.exe
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Echo off
```

!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.

```
.rdata
@.data
DSVwj@
HtxHuuJ
YY_tDh
PVVVSVV
YY_^[]
SVhWC@
<0|C<9
PSSj(j
t<Ht(Ht
QQSVW3
QSUVwhT
PSQhP|@
YYPjZjA
j[j]Pj[
YY_^[]
YYPjZjA
j[j]Pj[
strlen
memcpy
memmove
memset
memcmp
strcmp
strcpy
malloc
sprintf
strcat
strncpy
fwrite
fclose
sscanf
strstr
_sprintf
strncmp
realloc
_except_handler3
_beginthreadex
vsprintf
_vsprintf
MSVCRT.dll
WS2_32.dll
DeleteFileA
SetFileAttributesA
CloseHandle
TerminateProcess
ReadProcessMemory
OpenProcess
GetModuleFileNameA
GetModuleHandleA
GetCurrentProcessId
ReadFile
GetExitCodeProcess
PeekNamedPipe
CreateProcessA
```

DuplicateHandle  
GetCurrentProcess  
CreatePipe  
SearchPathA  
WriteFile  
GetLastError  
CopyFileA  
ExitProcess  
GetProcAddress  
LoadLibraryA  
GetSystemDirectoryA  
SetFileTime  
GetFileTime  
CreateFileA  
GetWindowsDirectoryA  
lstrlenA  
SetCurrentDirectoryA  
GetLocaleInfoA  
GetVersionExA  
GetComputerNameA  
GlobalMemoryStatus  
GetDiskFreeSpaceExA  
GetDriveTypeA  
GetTickCount  
QueryPerformanceFrequency  
QueryPerformanceCounter  
IsBadCodePtr  
TerminateThread  
InitializeCriticalSection  
EnterCriticalSection  
LeaveCriticalSection  
lstrcmpA  
CreateMutexA  
SetErrorMode  
KERNEL32.dll  
wsprintfA  
USER32.dll  
CryptReleaseContext  
CryptGenRandom  
CryptAcquireContextA  
RegCloseKey  
RegDeleteValueA  
RegOpenKeyExA  
RegEnumValueA  
RegQueryValueExA  
RegSetValueExA  
RegCreateKeyExA  
GetUserNameA  
ADVAPI32.dll  
ShellExecuteA  
SHELL32.dll  
\_strcmpi  
\_strnicmp  
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/  
D CKFDENECFDEFFCFGEFFCCACACACACACA  
EKEDFEEIEDCACACACACACACACACACACAAA  
PC NETWORK PROGRAM 1.0  
LANMAN1.0  
Windows for Workgroups 3.1a  
LM1.2X002  
LANMAN2.1  
NT LM 0.12  
9NTLMSSP  
WORKGROUP1QPxf2ISQgEV1bGKWindows 2000 2195  
Windows 2000 5.0  
NTLMSSP

Windows 2000 2195  
Windows 2000 5.0  
WORKGROUP  
Windows 2000 2195  
Windows 2000 5.0  
FUNMLEvdNzjntXznAvcOSDvcULULLFJmCPCmJgeXpbDCIAtjDTRPaxyXItXCfDxvjRXtWSyACqcPrzWHeaUKfrohneUS  
yZUZPzbe  
IFJUOUTEPuWkXmWxUGHMIEKCYENBAQPLZEDNO0BGMW  
bMZCTWLHYWI  
\SRVSVC  
D CKFDENEcfDEFFCFGEFFCCACACACACACA  
EKEDFEEIEDCACACACACACACACACACAAA  
NT LM 0.12  
Samba \*  
Windows 5.1  
Windows 5.0  
Windows 2000 LAN Manager\*  
NT LAN Manager \*.\*  
\*Service Pack 2\*  
\*Service Pack 1\*  
Windows Server 2003 \*.\*  
hws2\_T  
Scanned  
:%s in  
open IP(s) found  
:%s is open  
- Scanning  
:%s for  
second(s)  
Scanning  
:%s for  
second(s)  
Scanning  
:%s for  
second(s), t:%u s:%u  
- Attempted  
exploitation(s) on  
IP(s).  
Attempting to exploit  
with  
- Attempting to exploit IP's in list.  
Attempting to exploit IP's in list.  
Exploit statistics -  
Listing exploit statistics  
bot(s) found with string  
No bots found with string  
found string  
in %s (  
- Listing bots with string  
%s bots with string  
Killing  
Listing  
Cmd.exe process has terminated.  
Could not read data from process.  
cmd.exe  
Error while executing command.  
Remote cmd thread  
Received  
from  
sec with  
KB/sec  
- Receiving  
from  
Receiving  
from  
Content-Length: %u

```
Content-Length:
GET /%s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
- Unsupported protocol specified.
- Error while downloading
- Unable to start
- Successfully downloaded
with
KB/sec%s.
, executing
, updating
- No file to download specified.
tftp://
anonymous
ftp://
http://
- Cannot read source file
- Cannot write to destination file
file://
- Downloading
Downloading
QUIT :restarting
QUIT :exitting
- Module "%s" reported a crash in "%s": N=%u EAX=%08X EBX=%08X ECX=%08X EDX=%08X ESI=%08X
EDI=%08X EBP=%08X ESP=%08X EIP=%08X EFLAGS=%08X. Code: %08X (%s). %s...
Continuing
Restarting
EXCEPTION_FLT
EXCEPTION_INT_DIVIDE_BY_ZERO
EXCEPTION_STACK_OVERFLOW
EXCEPTION_NONCONTINUABLE_EXCEPTION
EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT
EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION
EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION
EXCEPTION_OTHER
InternetGetConnectedStateExA
wininet.dll
freeaddrinfo
getnameinfo
getaddrinfo
ws2_32.dll
WNetCancelConnection2W
WNetCancelConnection2A
WNetAddConnection2W
WNetAddConnection2A
mpr.dll
NetAddAlternateComputerName
NetScheduleJobAdd
NetApiBufferFree
NetRemoteTOD
NetShareEnum
NetUserEnum
NetUseDel
NetUseAdd
NetUseGetInfo
netapi32.dll
InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount
kernel32.dll
192.168.
%u.%u.%u.%u
GetModuleInformation
GetModuleFileNameExA
EnumProcessModules
EnumProcesses
psapi.dll
system
```

```
SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\Authori
zedApplications\List
%s:*:Enabled:%s
\explorer.exe
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
@echo off
:deleteagain
del /A:H /F %s
del /F %s
if exist %s goto deleteagain
del %s
Windows DLL Loader
QUIT :%s uninstalled.
%s.%s.%s.%s
System information - OS: Windows
(%s, v
). CPU: %s
MHz. Ram:
MB free. IPv6:
. Uptime:
day%s
hour%s
minute%s. Computername:
. User:
ProcessorNameString
HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0
Sysinfo thread
Network information - Host:
. Name:
. Type:
. IPv6:
. Firewallled:
. Latency:
, %u. IRC Uptime:
day%s
hour%s
minute%s.
Avarage
Unknown
Netinfo thread
%sTotal drives:
, Total space:
MB free.
MB free
unknown
ramdisk
cd-rom
remote
removable
Drive information -
Driveinfo thread
thread
- btg tried executing an unreadable address. (%08X)
- No threads running.
- Listing
threads:
QUIT :changing server
link v
%s [Win32]
Uptime - System:
day%s
hour%s
minute%s. IRC:
day%s
hour%s
minute%s
```

Debug mode is %s.  
Exe download server:  
Exe download server:  
f128enc+fab decrypted:  
f128enc+fab encrypted: =  
%c%s%c%c%u%c%u%s%c%c%c  
NICK %s  
USER %s %s %s :%s  
PASS %s  
NOTICE %s :  
PRIVMSG %s :  
message  
NOTICE %s :  
PRIVMSG %s :  
NOTICE  
link!link@link PRIVMSG %s :%s  
USERHOST %s  
JOIN %s %s  
MODE %s +xi  
MODE %s +smntu  
VERSION %s  
eggdrop v1.6.16  
VERSION link v%d.%03d%s (Win32)  
VERSION  
VERSION  
PRIVMSG  
PONG %s  
link!link@link  
ndEvery1  
#balengor  
- eip has left the endless loop for some reason...  
PING :%08X  
%08x%x%08x%3x%08x%08x  
C:\MA\lab\malexe001.exe  
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxy  
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPOQRSTUVWXYZ  
WORKGROUP1QPxf2ISQgEV1bGK  
\browser  
\..\..\AOHLMXY

pFile	Data	Description	Value
000098F4	0000B7BE	Hint/Name RVA	030A SetFileTime
000098F8	0000B7A8	Hint/Name RVA	01B6 GetSystemDirectoryA
000098FC	0000B798	Hint/Name RVA	0241 LoadLibraryA
00009900	0000B786	Hint/Name RVA	0197 GetProcAddress
00009904	0000B778	Hint/Name RVA	00B6 ExitProcess
00009908	0000B76C	Hint/Name RVA	003F CopyFileA
0000990C	0000B75C	Hint/Name RVA	0168 GetLastError
00009910	0000B750	Hint/Name RVA	038B WriteFile
00009914	0000B742	Hint/Name RVA	02C8 SearchPathA
00009918	0000B734	Hint/Name RVA	0061 CreatePipe
0000991C	0000B720	Hint/Name RVA	013B GetCurrentProcess
00009920	0000B7CC	Hint/Name RVA	015D GetFileTime
00009924	0000B6FC	Hint/Name RVA	0062 CreateProcessA
00009928	0000B6EC	Hint/Name RVA	027F PeekNamedPipe
0000992C	0000B6D6	Hint/Name RVA	0152 GetExitCodeProcess
00009930	0000B6CA	Hint/Name RVA	02A3 ReadFile
00009934	0000B6B4	Hint/Name RVA	013C GetCurrentProcessId
00009938	0000B6A0	Hint/Name RVA	0175 GetModuleHandleA
0000993C	0000B68A	Hint/Name RVA	0173 GetModuleFileNameA
00009940	0000B67C	Hint/Name RVA	0274 OpenProcess
00009944	0000B668	Hint/Name RVA	02A6 ReadProcessMemory
00009948	0000B654	Hint/Name RVA	0346 TerminateProcess
0000994C	0000B630	Hint/Name RVA	0304 SetFileAttributesA
00009950	0000B622	Hint/Name RVA	0081 DeleteFileA
00009954	0000B61A	Hint/Name RVA	033E Sleep
00009958	0000B8A6	Hint/Name RVA	0292 QueryPerformanceFrequency
0000995C	0000B7DA	Hint/Name RVA	004F CreateFileA
00009960	0000B7E8	Hint/Name RVA	01E5 GetWindowsDirectoryA
00009964	0000B800	Hint/Name RVA	03B3 lstrlenA
00009968	0000B80C	Hint/Name RVA	02F7 SetCurrentDirectoryA
0000996C	0000B824	Hint/Name RVA	016B GetLocaleInfoA
00009970	0000B836	Hint/Name RVA	01DB GetVersionExA
00009974	0000B846	Hint/Name RVA	010D GetComputerNameA
00009978	0000B85A	Hint/Name RVA	01F6 GlobalMemoryStatus
0000997C	0000B870	Hint/Name RVA	0146 GetDiskFreeSpaceExA
00009980	0000B886	Hint/Name RVA	014B GetDriveTypeA
00009984	0000B70E	Hint/Name RVA	0091 DuplicateHandle
00009988	0000B646	Hint/Name RVA	0031 CloseHandle
0000998C	0000B966	Hint/Name RVA	0300 SetErrorMode
00009990	0000B956	Hint/Name RVA	005C CreateMutexA
00009994	0000B94A	Hint/Name RVA	03A7 lstrcmpA
00009998	0000B932	Hint/Name RVA	0240 LeaveCriticalSection
0000999C	0000B91A	Hint/Name RVA	0096 EnterCriticalSection
000099A0	0000B8FE	Hint/Name RVA	0215 InitializeCriticalSection
000099A4	0000B8EC	Hint/Name RVA	0347 TerminateThread
000099A8	0000B8DC	Hint/Name RVA	0221 IsBadCodePtr
000099AC	0000B8C2	Hint/Name RVA	0291 QueryPerformanceCounter
000099B0	0000B896	Hint/Name RVA	01D1 GetTickCount
000099B4	00000000	End of Imports	KERNEL32.dll

000099B8	0000BA9A	Hint/Name RVA	0134 _itoa
000099BC	0000B5F4	Hint/Name RVA	01E1 _vsprintf
000099C0	0000B4BC	Hint/Name RVA	02BE strlen
000099C4	0000B5E8	Hint/Name RVA	02DC vsprintf
000099C8	0000B5D6	Hint/Name RVA	00A6 _beginthreadex
000099CC	0000B5C2	Hint/Name RVA	00CA _except_handler3
000099D0	0000B5BA	Hint/Name RVA	0249 exit
000099D4	0000B5B0	Hint/Name RVA	02A7 realloc
000099D8	0000B5A6	Hint/Name RVA	02C0 strcmp
000099DC	0000B59A	Hint/Name RVA	01AE _snprintf
000099E0	0000B590	Hint/Name RVA	02C5 strstr
000099E4	0000B586	Hint/Name RVA	02B5 sscanf
000099E8	0000B57E	Hint/Name RVA	0257 fopen
000099EC	0000B574	Hint/Name RVA	024C fclose
000099F0	0000B56A	Hint/Name RVA	0266 fwrite
000099F4	0000B562	Hint/Name RVA	0264 ftell
000099F8	0000B558	Hint/Name RVA	02C1 strcpy
000099FC	0000B54E	Hint/Name RVA	02B6 strcat
00009A00	0000B544	Hint/Name RVA	02B2 sprintf
00009A04	0000B53A	Hint/Name RVA	0291 malloc
00009A08	0000B532	Hint/Name RVA	025E free
00009A0C	0000B52A	Hint/Name RVA	023D atoi
00009A10	0000B520	Hint/Name RVA	02BA strcpy
00009A14	0000B516	Hint/Name RVA	02B8 strcmp
00009A18	0000B50C	Hint/Name RVA	0296 memcmp
00009A1C	0000B504	Hint/Name RVA	0243 clock
00009A20	0000B4FA	Hint/Name RVA	0299 memset
00009A24	0000B4F0	Hint/Name RVA	0298 memmove
00009A28	0000B4E8	Hint/Name RVA	019C _rotl
00009A2C	0000B4DE	Hint/Name RVA	0297 memcpy
00009A30	0000B4D6	Hint/Name RVA	019B _rotl
00009A34	0000B4CE	Hint/Name RVA	00F1 _ftol
00009A38	0000B4C6	Hint/Name RVA	0241 ceil
00009A3C	0000BA8E	Hint/Name RVA	01BD _strcmpi
00009A40	0000BAA2	Hint/Name RVA	01C5 _strnicmp
00009A44	00000000	End of Imports	MSVCRT.dll
00009A48	0000BA72	Hint/Name RVA	0107 ShellExecuteA
00009A4C	00000000	End of Imports	SHELL32.dll
00009A50	0000B984	Hint/Name RVA	02D8 wsprintfA
00009A54	00000000	End of Imports	USER32.dll

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00009A58	80000012	Ordinal	0012
00009A5C	80000015	Ordinal	0015
00009A60	80000097	Ordinal	0097
00009A64	8000000D	Ordinal	000D
00009A68	80000005	Ordinal	0005
00009A6C	8000000A	Ordinal	000A
00009A70	80000002	Ordinal	0002
00009A74	80000016	Ordinal	0016
00009A78	80000074	Ordinal	0074
00009A7C	80000033	Ordinal	0033
00009A80	8000006F	Ordinal	006F
00009A84	80000070	Ordinal	0070
00009A88	80000034	Ordinal	0034
00009A8C	80000006	Ordinal	0006
00009A90	80000008	Ordinal	0008
00009A94	80000017	Ordinal	0017
00009A98	80000009	Ordinal	0009
00009A9C	8000000B	Ordinal	000B
00009AA0	80000004	Ordinal	0004
00009AA4	80000013	Ordinal	0013
00009AA8	80000073	Ordinal	0073
00009AAC	8000000C	Ordinal	000C
00009AB0	80000003	Ordinal	0003
00009AB4	80000010	Ordinal	0010
00009AB8	00000000	End of Imports	WS2_32.dll